
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DECEPTION ALLEGED IN FIRST ARMS TALKS

Ex-Analyst at C.I.A. Says Russians Misled Nixon and Kissinger, Resulting in Loopholes

By DREW MIDDLETON

A former analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency has charged that President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger were deceived by the Soviet Union during negotiations for a limitation on strategic weapons, and that as a result they granted concessions and overlooked loopholes that enabled the Russians to camouflage an expansion of nuclear weaponry.

David S. Sullivan makes the charges in the winter issue of Strategic Review, which is a tax-exempt institution that relies largely on public support and is the organ of the United States Strategic Insti-

Mr. Sullivan was a C.I.A. analyst from 1971 to 1978. He now is legislative assist-ant on military affairs and strategic weapons issues to Senator Lloyd M. Bentsen, Democrat of Texas.

After citing specific instances of Soviet "deceit," Mr. Sullivan asks whether the United States "can learn from its past mistakes" and apply those lessons to cur-rent negotiations for a second-stage limitation treaty.

Article Based on Secret Analysis

According to qualified sources, the article in Strategic Review is based on a highly classified analysis written by Mr. Sullivan when he was in the C.I.A. The use of such reports is up to the Director of Central Intelligence, and no senior officials at the C.I.A. were willing to comment on the Sullivan report.

Mr. Sullivan offers three examples of what he calls Soviet deception during the

The first instance of deception uning the first round of strategic arms discussions.

The first instance of deception, he says, involved what are described as "heavy" ICBM's, intercontinental ballistic missiles. In May 1972, the Russians were also also as the says of the round ready producing a heavy ICBM — the SS-19. But the United States proposed, in Article II of the strategic arms agreement, that both parties undertake not to convert the launchers of older missiles into launchers suitable for heavy ICBM's.

The Russians could not agree to this stipulation while they were in the process stipulation while they were in the process of deploying the SS-19, according to Mr. Sullivan. So they refused to agree on a definition of a heavy ICBM, "leaving a Apped with the most important United States goal in SALT I: constraints on Soviet heavy ICBM's."

Mr. Kissinger, at a Congressional briefing on June 15, 1972, made clear the American interpretation of Article II and the Administration's definition of a heavy missile. He cited as safeguards a specific statement in the agreement "that no missile larger than a heavyweight light missile that now exists can be substituted." He also asserted that a provision forbidding changes in silo configurations, meaning underground basing and launching sites, was a safeguard against the introduction of heavy missiles. 1:

A similar problem arose over the ceiling on Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missiles proposed by the United

The Russians argued that because they lacked forward submarine bases comparable to those of the United States Navy in Guam, Spain and Britain, they should be allowed larger limits than the United States.

Mr. Kissinger accepted the position. He told a Congressional committee that "because of the difference in geography" the Soviet Union required three nuclear missile submarines to two American nuclear submarines to be able to keep an equal

number in battle-ready positions.

The article reports, however, that the Soviet: Union-had already completed development of the long-range SS-N-8 submarine-launched missile, which "would be fired at most United States targets without leaving its home ports." It has been deployed since 1972.

Ban on Mobile Missiles

President Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, were involved in negotiating a formal ban on mobile inter-continental ballistic missiles. Mr. Sullivan said that the leaders promised each other that their countries would not build mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles. But he notes that Mr. Brezhnev refused to write that promise into the interim agreement.

Mr. Sullivan, citing "public sources," asserts that the Russians "have produced and covertly stockpiled" about 100 mo-bile SS-16's. Mr. Sullivan argues that the intermediate range mobile SS-16 can easily be upgraded to an intercontential missile.

The covert stockpiling, the author contends, gives the Russians an equivalent to a proposed American multiple-aim-point system of mobile missiles before deployment of such missiles has been planned or production begun.

The Russians, Mr. Sullivan adds, have camouflaged and concealed all SS-16 production and development from American intelligence.